

THE EFFECTS OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS INCOME EQUALITY, ETHNIC DIVERSITY
AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM ON THE LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY

by

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LL.B., Yangon University of Distance Education, 2008

A Thesis

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Master of Arts in Political Science

Department of Political Science

in the Graduate School

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THESIS APPROVAL

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A Thesis Submitted in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Master of Arts in Political Science
in the field of Political Science

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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

KHIN MAUNG WIN, for the Master of Arts degree in POLITICAL SCIENCE,
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TITLE: THE EFFECTS OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS INCOME EQUALITY, ETHNIC
DIVERSITY AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM ON THE LEVEL OF
DEMOCRACY

MAJOR PROFESSOR: Dr. Stephen R. Bloom

There are few works that explores the relationship between the attitude towards income equality and levels of democracy in the previous literature. However, there is an abundance of literature on democracy and its determinants. In this paper, I analyze why levels of democracy differ among countries. I assume that positive attitudes or feelings toward income equality, ethnic diversity and democratic political systems are essential to the promotion of democracy. I hypothesize that such positive attitudes to all of these promote democracy, all other things being equal. First, income equality is crucial as to development of democracy. I argue that positive attitudes towards income equality advances democracy by means of reducing negative consequences of income inequality and by means of creating positive circumstances for promotion of democracy because it is less likely for being income equality to advance democracy without positive attitude towards income equality. Second, support for ethnic diversity is also important to the promotion of democracy. I argue that ethnic diversity is not a block or barrier to democracy. Actually, ethnic diversity can be a fertile soil for democracy if the positive attitude towards it is practiced because proper or positive attitudes towards ethnic

diversity leads to a change from the negative perception of ethnic diversity to the positive perception of it. Such positive perception of ethnic diversity welcomes and nurtures it to be an essential part of making democracy rich. Thus, I hypothesize that positive feeling about ethnic diversity can also promote democracy. Third, the democratic political system itself is essential to advancement of democracy in all countries because it establishes minimal democratic framework and procedures that are important to further improvement of democracy. I argue that such democratic political system and its positive consequences require the positive attitude towards it in advance. Thus, I hypothesize that the positive attitude towards the democratic political system also promotes democracy. The support for my study comes from the existing cross-national datasets. The data for the dependent variable that is the level of democracy is from Polity IV (Polity IV Annual Time-Series 1800-2010). The data for the independent variables are from the World Values Survey 1981-2008. It is cross-country and cross-sectional analysis. The findings show that only one factor that is the positive attitude towards income equality has the positive and significant effect on the promotion of democracy while the other two do not show a statistical significant effects on the level of democracy.

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During my study in this Political Science Department, professors and graduate students I have been familiar with inside or outside of class have been very helpful to me when I came across difficulties. Without their help, it might have been more difficult for me. Thus, I want to express my thanks for all their help with this study. The experience and knowledge that I have learned here has helped me professionally. I also believe that it will help my home country as it tries to democratize.

I have done my best in this thesis. However, there may be mistakes or errors. These are my responsibility.

PREFACE

Democracy is a popular subject for comparative study. There are also many approaches to the study of democracy. This thesis focuses on one aspect of democracy, specifically the level of democracy of countries. Both qualitative and quantitative methods have been employed to explain the emergence and persistence of democracy I use the quantitative methods and statistical model to explain why the countries have the different levels of democracy.

First, I introduce an initial analysis of different levels in democracy across countries and then discuss what factors explain these differences. I explore the meaning of democracy, its features, its dimensions, its aspects and its qualities as covered in the existing literature. I give my opinion on each of these factors after analyzing this literature. In sum, this section of definition provides a theoretical overview of the democratization literature.

Second, I build basic assumption for my research hypothesis. I develop my argument for what factors influence the support for the level of democracy introducing my model. I advance hypotheses that supports for income equality, ethnic diversity, and democratic political systems have relationship with the level of democracy.

Third, I use the data from existing cross-national datasets to test whether the hypotheses. Specifically, I employ Polity IV (Polity IV Annual Time-Series Data 1918-2010) for the dependent variable, the level of democracy, and for independent variables from World Values Survey 1981-2008 (2011). With respect to the methodology, I use a statistical method– the regression model– in testing the hypothesis in this thesis.

Fourth, I present the results of the regression analysis. Three factors are included in the regression analysis. However, only one factor that is the attitude towards income equality significantly affects the level of democracy while the other two factors, the positive attitudes

towards ethnic diversity and democratic political system, do not. The relationship between the positive attitude towards income equality and the level of democracy is positive. However, the effect of the attitude towards income equality is positively significant only when the other two factors that are attitudes towards ethnic diversity and democratic political systems correlate with it. The findings are discussed in the Results and Discussion section, in details.

Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the implications of the study and some of its limitations. I sum up about something important with regard to the level of democracy and its explanatory factors. I summarize the positive attitude model that is fit for the finding. I give general inferences about the findings, its potential weakness and how such weakness can be removed through future research.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Democracy is an important issue in all countries whether they are democratic or not. Countries that are not democratic are still struggling for it and countries that are democratic are still trying to preserve or make it better. There were few democracies in the past, but their numbers are increasing in the present even though some countries still lack democracy. Even in so-called democratic countries, their democracies are not all the same. There are real varieties in types, aspects, qualities, degrees, dimensions and levels of democracies. Some countries are more democratic than others. I trace some key arguments for why democracies differ in this paper. Specifically, I examine why levels of democracy differ across countries. Many scholars analyzed democracy and produced many literatures of democracy. They found that certain factors have explanatory power for it. However, there is very little literature that discusses the relationship between public attitudes and the levels of democracy. One of the reasons why this paper focuses on the relationship between positive attitudes towards some important issues such as income equality, ethnic diversity and democratic political systems, and the levels of democracy is to enrich the current literature of democracy.

Level of Democracy

Defining Democracy

It is important to know how previous scholars have defined democracy. There are various opinions of what democracy means and what elements, components, aspects, features, dimensions, and qualities are included in defining it when they conceptualize democracy. Sometimes scholars simplify democracy as a concept composed of a criterion. However,

sometimes they define democracy as composite concept that is made of two or more than two criteria. Democracy is a multidimensional concept (Coppedge 2002). In addition, scholars also have different opinions of how democracy is measured. Such differences about democracy among scholars may be because of their different emphases on different aspects, features, dimensions and qualities of democracy, and on different methodologies they use. There are differences in conceptualization, measurement and aggregation of the democracy with their own respective strengths and weakness (Munck and Verkuilen 2002).

There are many definitional variations of democracy among scholars with respect to whether a country is democratic or not. A country that has significant and widespread competition, high political participation, and enough civil and political liberties is democratic (Gasiorowski 1990, 1993). Bollen (1980, 1993) defines political democracy as minimization of political power of the elite and maximization of political power of the non-elite. The power of elite is limited but the power of the non-elite is extended in democracy. Bollen reduces this abstract definition of political democracy to two main concepts that are political liberty and political sovereignty. That is, democracy is composed of political liberty and political sovereignty.

Mattes et al. (2007) defines democracy by using freedom, fairness, and equality. “Citizens judges democracy not so much on the delivery of improved material welfare, but on the basic of whether they judge elections to be free and fair, they feel able to speak their minds freely, they are treated fairly and equally, or whether their government is riddled with corruptions” (Mattes et al. 2007, p.198). In other words, free, fair and equal treatments or, freedom, fairness and equality are the criteria that citizens use to measure democracy. They also

describe democracy as the systematized rules and procedures of power competition and representation in decision-making.

Differently, Almond and Verba (1963) assert that democratic idea is formed of the individual freedom and dignity, and the principled government by the public consent. In addition, “political democracy is closely associated with freedom of the individual” (Huntington 1991, p.28). It means that individual freedom has close association with the democracy. There is also high correlation between the existence of democracy and the existence of individual liberties. “Liberty is, in a sense, the peculiar virtue of democracy. If one is concerned with liberty as an ultimate social value, one should also be concerned with the fate of democracy” (p.28). Moreover, democratic norms such as free speech, free elections, a free press, and demonstration rights are also the accepted features in advanced democracies and democratizing states in central Europe (Fuchs 1998).

However, there are other scholars who have their own accounts of democracy. Jagers and Gurr (1995) suggest that the capacity of representative selection and capability of constitutional constraints on the executives should be taken into consideration to evaluate democraticness of political system. That is, not only selection capability of citizens but also their ability to restrict the exercise of power of the executive is to be taken into account. Huntington (1991) supposes that the definition of democracy stems from the authority, purpose and procedures for government. The central procedure of democracy involves the selection of leaders through competitive elections by the people they govern. He asserts that contestation and participation are the two main dimensions of democracy in line with Dahl’s (1971) work that identifies competition and participation as the attributes of democracy (See Coppedge, Alvarez and Maldonado, 2008 and also Munck and Verkuilen 2002). Most indicators of democracy in the

literature of democracy fall within these Dahl's democratic dimensions that are contestation and inclusiveness (Coppedge, Alvarez and Maldonado, 2008). Nevertheless, Jagers and Gurr (1995) simply assume that “ democracy is defined by what it is not; democracy is the opposite of autocracy” (p. 469). That is to say, democracy can be simplified as an opposition to autocracy. However, Dahl (1971), Coppedge and Reinicke (1990), Gasiorowski (1990, 1993) and Vanhanen (1990) also have their own account of democracy although there is some overlap among them.

Jagers and Gurr (1995) discuss about measurement of regime types by authority characteristics in the discussion of Polity II. They state that democracy has three essential elements:(1) “the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preference about alternative political policies and leaders” (2) “the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of executive power”, and (3) “the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation”. According to them, democracy indicators are drawn from “subjective coding of the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and the level of constraints on the chief executive” (p.471). In addition, democracy has the three fundamental components in Polity IV Project: Dataset Users' Manual (Marshall, Jagers and Gurr 2011).

Democracy is described as the following:

Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of checks and balances, freedom of the press, and so on are means to, or specific manifestations of, these general principles. We do not include coded data on civil liberties. (Marshall, Jagers, and Gurr 2011, p.14)

In sum, there are differences in conceptualization of democracy, which depends on the different focuses on different aspects of democracy and different methodologies applied for the research. The main differences are: whether democracy is multidimensional or not; whether democracy is composed of individual liberties or not; whether democracy is made of civil and political liberty; whether democracy is formed of institutional constraints or not; whether democracy consists of political participation or not; and whether democracy is made of competition or not. Similarly, different aspects of democracy demand different explanatory factors. The following section is the description of factors that are assumed or found to have affected democracy through different methodologies focusing on different aspects of democracy in the previous literature of democracy.

The Factors Assumed or Found to Have Effects on Democracy

Scholars have posited many factors that are assumed to promote democracy in the democratization literature. I discuss a few factors that are assumed to positively or negatively influence democracy. It also matters what outcome we are looking at. There are different factors that might account for survival of democracy, persistence of democracy, consolidation of democracy, and the quality of democracy.

There are certain factors that affect the survival of democracy negatively or positively in reference to analysis of the survival of democracy. Diamond (1999) underlines regime legitimacy and democratic institution-supporting political culture that are important for the survival of democracy. Legitimacy of the regime and the political culture in favor of democratic institutions are crucial to the survival of democracy. Moreover, Diamond points out the importance of political factors on democracy in addition to economic factors, such as the

performance of the economy. However, Linz and Stepan (1996) state that the survival of democracy needs five conditions: a functional state, a civil society, a self-ruling political society, the rule of law, and a set of rules, norms, institutions and regulations are necessary for the survival of democracy. Nevertheless, Luebbert (1991) argues that a united middle-class matters for the survival of liberal democracy. Liberal democracy survived in those countries where middle classes were not divided by religion, language, region, or urban-rural differences. The middle class— a landed elite Luebbert suggests— is crucial in maintenance of democracy in the time of crisis. Moreover, literacy also affects the survival of democracy. Higher literacy rates contribute to the survival of democracy measured in years or duration of democracy (Weede 1989). In addition, there are two conditions necessary for the survival of democracy. Mattes et al. (2007) describe that “Democracy has a low probability of break down where two conditions are met, namely that large majorities of citizens demand democracy as their preferred political regime, and judge that their leaders have internalized and follow democracy’s institutional rules” (p.193).

Other scholars show the important of economic factors. Muller (1995) emphasizes the importance of income inequality for democracy. Muller recognizes the equality in term of rights and opportunities. In the work of Przeworski et al. (2000), per capita income matters for survival of democracy. It is found that survival of democracy is more successful on condition of economic growth. Especially, income per capita is important for the survival for democracy. “Per capita income has a strong impact on the survival of democracy” (Przeworski et al. 2000, 98). In other words, income affects survival of democracy. Higher income conditions survival of democracy. It can be said that income is a strong explanatory factor for the survival of democracy. Then, any factor that promotes income might have similar effect on the survival of

democracy. Przeworski et al. (2000) also highlights the importance of economic prosperity for survival of democracy. However, for Lipset (1994), democratic culture also matters in survival of democracy.

Building on this discussion of economic factors, Collier (1999) argues that labor mobilization matters for democratization. Collier's historical narrative highlights the critical role of the labor mobilization and its positive correlation with democracy. However, Laitin does not agree with Collier and points out the selection bias problem in Collier's work. Collier's narrative approach describes that labor or the working class has the role in historical process of democratization. In addition, Renshon (2000) highlights the important role of ordinary citizens in successful democratization. According to his social capitalist view, "it is the engagement of citizens that provide the building blocks of successful democracy" (Renshon 2000, p.200). In other words, the success of democracy depends on citizen engagement. In the work of Wang et al. (2006), political tolerance matters for successful democracy. Political intolerance and polarization is said to be impediments to successful democracy. Political tolerance is said as a covariate factor for successful democracy. For Putnam et al. (1993), social capital that means membership in organizations of all sorts plays an important role for successful democracy. Putnam et al. emphasizes the importance of social capital and social infrastructure in successful democracy. Putnam's research monitored the development of social capital–membership in organizations of all sorts– across time and across different regions of Italy by finding that those regions without adequate 'social capital' had weaken democratic institutions.

With respect to analysis of persistence of democracy, social capital is also assumed to matter. Renshon (2000) emphasizes the importance of social capital for persistence of democracy. According to social capital theory, the relationship between human beings, their

belief and their institutions are important in foundation of democracy. Besides, Inglehart (1990) emphasizes on the importance of political culture's positive effect on persistence of democratic institutions. Inglehart (2003) underlines that political culture predicts better long-term democratic stability that relates to level of democracy. There is strong correlation between mass attitudes and democracy. In other words, there is higher support for democracy and authority rejection in the stable democracies. According to Inglehart, post-materialist values such as tolerance, trust, political activism remains a much stronger predictors of stable democracy. That is, these values strongly predict stable democracy.

As for democratic consolidation, scholars cite additional requisite conditions. Democratic consolidation happens when reversal or breakdown of democracy is less likely (Przeworski 1996). Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan's consolidated democracy emphasizes the importance of "civil society, political society, rule of law, institutionalized state bureaucracy and economic society". However, Jagers and Gurr (1995) point out that there are factors that threaten democratic consolidation. For example, economic scarcity, political corruption, ethnic conflicts and international warfare are all social process, which threatens the consolidation of democracy in the third wave. Thus, it is important that such conditions should not be for democratic consolidation. However, there is the exception that conditions for democratic regime in early stage may not be the same conditions for development and consolidation of democracy in later state (Huntington 1991).

Solt (2008) emphasizes equal economic distribution in his explanation of democracy. Democracy depends on an equal distribution of economic resources. For Kenneth A. Bollen and Robert W. Jackman (1985), the level of economic development impacts a prominent effect on political democracy in the 1960s, even when other factors are taken into account. There is

significant relationship between economic development and political participation (Solt 2004). Socio-economic variables are significant and consistent predictors for self-motivated political participation. There are also other scholars' works as to economic development model to explain democracy. Lipset (1959) points out that economic development has a strong relationship with democracy. According to institutionalist perspectives, design of political institutions, economic conditions and social conditions play important role in political democracy (March and Olsen 1984). As for Linz and Stepan (1996), political institutions matter greatly for democracy. It will not be unreasonable to assume that certain political institutions are important for democracy.

Bratton (1999) points out the peoples' demands for democratic norms or criteria matter for democratization. "Democratization often originates in popular demands for long-denied rights of expression, association, and political representation" (Bratton 1999, p.549). In other words, the demand for rights of expression, association and political representation by the people are thought to be the origin of democratization. Huntington (1991) emphasizes the importance of legitimacy failure, economic growth and crisis, religion, external actors, and snowball or domino effects. "A number of studies, for instance, have shown high correlations between various social and economic factors and the existence of democratic institution" (p.34). In other words, social and economic factors highly predict the existence of democratic institutions. Although the economic factors are not determinant factors, they significantly affect democratization. Huntington also assumes that there is "the crucial role of political leadership and political skill in bringing about democracy" (p.39).

In sum, there are many factors that are thought to affect democracy, its aspects, its features, its dimensions, and its qualities. Thus, it is very important to clear whether specific factors significantly affect democracy. Analysis of different aspects, features, qualities or

dimensions of democracy may lead to finding of the different explanatory factors. However, it cannot be said that such different factors have no correlation among them independently or interdependently to affect democracy until all claimed factors are included in the regression analysis and lack of relationship among them is proved. That is, only can it be sure that a factor significant in the explanation of one aspect of democracy has no relationship with other factors that are significant in explanation of other aspects, features, dimensions and qualities of democracy until it is proved that such relationship among them does not exist. That is, the factors I discuss in the democratic literature analysis above are still relevant to be taken into account for the research of democracy. It is not unreasonable to assume that such factors are possible to explain or predict democracy and one of its aspects.

However, it is not possible to include all those factors in this paper because of the data accessibility, financial constraints and time. Thus, although I assume that there are more than one factor might be involved in explanation of democracy, I look at levels of democracy in countries around the world in this thesis. It is not illogical to assume that levels of democracy in countries may depend on many factors. That is, it is not unreasonable to assume that the level of democracy as a whole might be affected when one aspect of democracy is influenced by a factor or many factors. In other words, democracy is a composite concept that has many indicators. I use indicators of democracy from the Polity IV database. The Polity Democracy Index shows that democracy consists the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared 2008). In the Polity IV (2011), democracy is measured by using competitiveness in political participation, the limitations on the executive, and open and competitive recruitment of the executive. Thus, I assume that level of democracy may depend on

many factors. However, I will explore a few factors that, I strongly assume, affect the level of democracy. In general, those factors that can affect the level of democracy are attitudinal, cultural and structural. This thesis specifically focuses attitudinal factors as explanatory variables that can influence the level of democracy. However, this thesis does not preclude that other cultural or structural factors have no influence on the level of democracy. Thus, until it is proved that other cultural or structural factors lack influence on the level of democracy, it is not reasonable to rule out those factors. However, as I said, this thesis specifically pays attention only to attitudinal or behavioral factors as predictors of levels of democracy. That is why the findings from thesis may be changed– i.e., significant influences disappear or are enhanced– when other cultural or structural factors are included into analysis of levels of democracy when there are available data for structural and cultural variables or factors, and those data are used by the coming researchers or students for analysis of levels of democracy. In sum, this thesis only focuses on the positive attitudes toward income equality, ethnic diversity, and democratic political system to explain the level of democracy.

Positive Attitude Towards Income Equality

Income inequality is an important issue in democracies. There is some literature on the relationship between income inequality and democratization, and between democracy and income inequality. However, the former focuses on the relationship between changes in income inequality and changes in democracy. The latter emphasizes the effect of democracy or democratization on income inequality. “The conventional wisdom in political economy literature is that income per capita has a causal effect on democracy” (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared 2008). They challenge the causal and positive relationship between the income and

democracy, i.e. higher income as the determinant of democracy, using time-lag, 25-year, 50-year, 100 year and 500 year period income and democracy data analysis. Except the 500-year period analysis, there is no evidence of positive effect of income on the democracy. Even, in the 500-year interval analysis there is no evidence of income's positive effect on democracy when historical factors are controlled for. However, they do not deny that there is a positive relation between the income and democracy. They just deny the causal relationship between them.

In his review of Muller's (1988) work, Weede challenges the significant relation that Muller finds between the age of democracy and decrease in the income inequality. According to Weede (1989), Muller's finding is questionable because Muller neglects the significant explanatory variables that already explained income inequality, such as literacy as an explanatory factor for income inequality. Weede's finding shows that there is no robust relation between the experience of democracy and income equality (Weede 1989).

In their analysis of this literature, Bollen and Jackman (1995) points out a lack of sound rationale between inequality and rates of democratization, a lack of sound measurements, temporal variation in income inequality in some countries analyzed, and robust results for hypothesis of that increase in inequality causes decrease in democracy. With respect to conceptual issue, Bollen and Jackman challenges the lack of clarity in the concept of equality—the size distribution of income and equity in Muller's work, and omitted variables that have correlation with both income inequality and political democracy. In their suggestion, one of the important area Bollen and Jackman (1995) emphasizes for future research is behavior of key political actor that may have effect on changes in democracy or rates of democratization. This emphasis implies that human behavior factor is essential to be counted to explain changes in democracy although whether only behavior of key political actors or behavior of all citizens

should be accounted is the further question for specific research purpose. Muller (1995) assumes that the income inequality the cause of instability in political system hinder democracy (Bollen and Jackman 1995). Muller's work is not directly related to the analysis of levels of democracy analysis although it analyzes changes in democracy from 1965 to 1980.

This paper focuses on relationship between the feelings or attitudes towards income equality and the level of democracy. Before it is elaborated, it is important to make clear what the attitude towards income equality is. Attitudes are different from conditions. Attitudes mean personal feelings and opinions about the conditions or issues. Its nature is subjective. For examples, attitude towards income equality is a concept of subjective personal feeling of the respondents about income equality that is the objective condition. Income equality is a concept composed of objective intrinsic components such as equality of household income or expenditures. However, there are also different views of which components form income equality/inequality. Welfarists for distributional analysis views expenditure as an appropriate indicator to measure economic well-being (Jenkins and Kerm 2008). But, some scholars prefer to income or household income to measure income inequality/equality. "Economic inequality is often considered to be about differences in access or control over economic resources rather the actual exercise of that power, in which case income is the measure preferred to consumption: a miserly millionaire is considered rich rather than poor" (p. 2). Income equality and income inequality are objective aspects that matter to democracy. What I focus on in this paper is the attitudes towards that condition. Thus, I suppose that the attitudes toward it will affect democracy. That is, the positive attitudes held by respondents towards the income equality can affect the level of democracy.




Figure 1. Positive Attitude Model 1: The Effects of Positive Attitude Towards Income Equality on Level of Democracy




Figure 2. Positive Attitude Model 2: Direct and Indirect Effects of Positive Attitudes towards Income Equality, Ethnic Diversity and Political Democratic System on Level of Democracy

This model named as the Positive Attitude Model assumes that income inequality is the problem that can degrade democracy. Such income inequality might have consequential problems. These problems weaken the components, such as competitiveness and public constraints on the chief executive, of democracy, thus degrading democracy. For example, the consequential problems of income inequality are accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few people, extension of rich-and-poor gap or have-or-have-not gap, and creation of unequal opportunities and rights in political, social and economic statuses. Moreover, the income inequality can degrade socio-economic status of the majority, the poor or underprivileged. Thus, the people who suffer from income inequality may have to choose submission or resolution to the political, social and economic grievances or problems caused by income inequality. The resort by the victims of income inequality to revolution to get remedy for such grievances can disturb the stability of the society the extent of the instability of which depends on the methods, violence or non-violence, they choose to fight for remedy. The resort by those of victims of income inequality to submission to such political, social and economic grievances may choose to handle their difficulties turning themselves into criminal committing such as theft, robbing and murder. As a consequence, these crimes to great extent destabilize the society. Such negative scenarios for the victims of income inequality weaken their competitiveness in political participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, and their power to constrain the executive, which might affect the level of democracy. Thus, to handle such consequences of income inequality, it is essential to recognize that these are the issues to solve. There has to be willingness and attitudes to sort out such income inequality. Thus, the attitude towards income inequality is an initial important step to do so. It precedes the attempt or actions to tackle income inequality. Then, it is important and necessary to ask which kinds of attitudes, positive or

negative, towards income inequality to handle the consequential problems of income inequality. I assume that positive attitudes towards income inequality differ from negative attitudes towards income inequality. Thus, their consequences will differ too. I suppose that negative attitude towards income inequality is more concerned with solution of the consequential problems of income inequality. Here I term and label the negative attitude towards income inequality as “positive attitude towards income equality” in this thesis. That is, positive attitude towards income equality is the same as the negative attitude towards income inequality.

Thus, positive attitudes toward income equality are crucial to creating the positive scenario that avoids the destructive consequences of income inequality. Moreover, these positive scenarios can promote income equality. Income equality removes or alleviates the negative consequences of income inequality. For example, it can reduce the accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few people by making more fair income distribution, by narrowing rich-and-poor gap and equalizing economic status. In addition, Income equality creates more opportunities and rights in political, social and economic statuses for the majority, the poor or underprivileged, and also empowers their political competitiveness and participation. Thus, these positive situations let the people less suffer from income inequality and its negative consequences such as submission or resolution to the political, social and economic grievances or problems. When people are satisfied with income equality, they are less likely to resort to revolution, violent or non-violent revolution. In such situation stable society, more equal income enhances the people’s competitiveness in political participation, competitiveness in executive recruitment, and their power to constrain the executive, which can affect the level of democracy. For example, because of their income status that are more equal, they can have accesses to social, political and economic affairs without being left behind because of financial limitations. Moreover, their equal

income status itself becomes the opportunity and condition for their involvement in political affairs. However, it is unreasonable to have such positive conditions without attempts to take or taking steps or actions for income equality. Moreover, it is unlikely to have an attempt to take or taking necessary actions for income equality and its consequential benefits without the positive attitudes to do so. However, there may be exceptions to such reasoning by arguing that positive attitude towards income equality does not always produce or mean “income equality”. But, if there is income equality, it is not unreasonable to assume that there are steps or actions taken to have such income equality. If there are such steps or actions taken for income equality, it is reasonable to suppose that there is attitudes or attempts to take such actions for income equality. Thus, the positive attitude towards income equality leads to attempts to take or taking actions for income equality. Income equality produces positive consequences. Those positive consequences enhance citizens’ competitiveness in political participation, competitiveness in executive recruitments, and capacity of constraining chief executive. Thus, in sum positive attitude toward income equality enhances or promote the level of democracy.

Such positive effects of income equality, however, may be less likely to be significant without the influences of the other positive attitudes towards other issues such as ethnic diversity and the democratic political system. That is, without positive attitudes towards ethnic diversity and political democratic systems, there is less likely to have significant effects by “the positive attitudes towards income equality” on the level of democracy because lack of positive attitudes towards ethnic diversity and political democratic system can negate the effects of the positive attitudes towards income equality on level of democracy. Ethnic diversity without the positive attitudes toward it can cause more distrust and doubt among the different groups. Such distrust and doubts leads to omission of those who are different from political affairs. That is, it can

cause political discrimination against the different ethnics, which weaken their competitiveness of political participation, and the openness of executive recruitment. It can unbalance the power among the different groups, thus damaging the power of the different ethnics to restrict the chief executive. In sum, the ethics diversity without the positive attitudes causes political, social and economic discrimination based on their differences of the ethnics. Such discriminations weaken competitiveness of the political participation of the people, thus degrading the democracy.

Reversely, ethnic diversity with positive attitude reduces these political, social and economic discrimination based on the their difference of the ethnics. The lack of such discriminations empowers the competitiveness of political participation of them, thus upgrading democracy.

Moreover, democratic political system without positive attitudes towards it can fail to take standardized democratic measures, such as democratic rules, procedures, and instructions to improve democracy. Such failures to set up proper democratic frameworks weaken the competitiveness of political participation, of executive recruitment, of openness of executive recruitment, thus demoting democracy. Reversely, democratic political system with positive attitudes toward it leads to take standard democratic measures, such as democratic rules, procedures and institution. It encourages fairer and more equal democratic frameworks for the competitiveness of political participation, of executive recruitment, and of openness of executive recruitment, thus enhancing democracy.

Thus, in sum I assume that the effects of positive attitude towards income equality show little or no significance without other positive attitudes in correlation. I reason that the negative attitudes towards ethnic diversity and the democratic political system may hinder promotion of level of democracy, directly and indirectly. It can also negate the effects of positive attitude towards income equality on level and democracy and cause the negative consequences. These

positive attitudes co-enhance the effects of positive attitude towards income equality on the level of democracy. Thus, I expect that positive attitudes towards income equality promote democracy. That is, changes in positive attitude toward income equality will cause changes in the level of democracy, which means the more positive the attitude towards the income equality is the higher the level of democracy will be. I expect that there is a positive relationship between positive attitudes towards income equality and the level of democracy. Thus I hypothesize:

Hypothesis 1: Positive attitudes toward income equality promote democracy. The more positive the attitude towards the income equality is the higher the level of democracy is.

Positive Attitude Towards Ethnic Diversity

Burma is an ethnically diverse country. According to official records, there are 135 communities with different and distinct cultures that can be clustered into eight major ethnic. The Burmese military has used Burma's ethnic diversity as a reason justifying its uphold of power since 1962. Ironically, the neighboring country India with diverse and unique different ethnicities is the world largest democratic country. Although whether how much democratic the India is may vary, the ethnic diversity is not the barrier or hindrance for flourishing of democracy. There are many arguments whether ethnic diversity deters democracy or not in the previous literature. "Scholars have traditionally believed that internal ethnic divisions are detrimental to democratic stability" (Reilly 2000/2001, p. 164). Many scholars have held the view of internal ethnic divisions as the harmful problem to democratic stability. The logic behind such view is that politicization of ethnic demands for voter mobilization in ethnically divided society leads to zero-sum politics including of one ethnic group but excluding of another. The demands of one

group expense that of another ethnic group, thus leading to the sharp divisions for accommodation, which damage democracy. In sum, increase in ethnic heterogeneity hinders democracy. It is the usual view that the danger of ethnic division and tribalism is the origin of the failure of democracy. That view is backed with the results that show negative effects of ethnic divisions on sustainable democracy from the cross-national studies of political stability (See also Dahl 1971; Powell 1982; Lane and Ersson 1990). However, “ A few scholars argue that ethnic fragmentation may actually assist prospects for democracy in multiethnic states” (Reilly 2000/2001, p. 166). Reilly states that there is a few scholars’ view of ethnic fragmentation as a help to democracy. India’s democratic success comes from its diversity and balance of ethnic diversity as well as Philippine’s. Moreover, Papua New Guinea has high rank of democracy in developing world. They argue that ethnic fragmentation not negatively affect state stability and performance. Reilly stands along with these few scholars arguing that ethnic diversity is the pure origin for democratic success in Papua New Guinea (PNG). The structure of ethnic diversity in PNG does not allow political dominance and monopoly by one group over another but rather there is balance among different ethnic. Reilly from his micro-level analysis perspective assert that ethnic fragmentation does not impede democracy but rather help democracy consolidate under some circumstances. From his macro-level analysis perspective, Reilly examine data sufficiency for the common claim of the negative effects of ethnic diversity on democracy and criticize the defective measurement of ethnic fragmentation used in the unreliable dataset, Atlas Narodov Mira, for such conventional wisdom and the liner relationship between ethnic diversity and democracy, pointing out complexity of relationship between them. The challengers of the negative view of ethnic diversity on democracy claim that ethnic plurality help democracy in the absence of one dominant and hegemonic ethnic over others.

Although I am in line with the view of ethnic diversity not as a negative factor for democracy, but I doubt about their logic that ethnic diversity help democracy when hegemonic and dominance of one ethnic over others are absent. In fact, such balance will be impossible if we look at how politics works. It will be difficult to find such balance even in PNG and India. The degree of hegemony and monopoly by one ethnic group may be matter other then absence of it. That, there will still be hegemony or monopoly by one ethnic group over others, but that hegemony and monopoly is the tolerable level for other ethnic. I argue that ethnic diversity is not a block or barrier to democracy. Actually, ethnic diversity can be a fertile soil or ground to promote democracy. It may be potentially the best solution for nationhood of the diverse ethnics within a country because I don't assume that ethnic diversity itself has intrinsic nature of problem. It is more reasonable to assume whether which kinds of the attitudes towards ethnic diversity people have to have for living in society, such as peaceful coexistence without constant purge of the different. Before I explain how attitudes towards ethnic diversity can affect the level of democracy, it needs clarification of what it means and how it differs from ethnic diversity. Attitude toward ethnic diversity is a subjective concept that means the personal feelings and opinions of the respondents toward ethnic diversity that is an objective condition. Ethnic diversity is a concept composed of groups of different ethnic identity. Most scholars objectively define ethnic diversity in spite of their disagreement on some components of it. The concept of ethnic diversity they accept is the ethnic identification based on ethno linguistic differences (Reilly 2000/2001). However, Reilly claims that there are also different views on defining ethnic identity. Some scholars define an ethnic group as the group that has different and unique cultural community having common language, religion, racial feature such as the color of the skin and kinship. Other scholars narrowly define an ethnic group as a community of shared

cultures and customs such as common language and shared destiny. This paper focuses on the proper or positive attitude towards ethnic diversity other than ethnic diversity– the objective condition. I suppose that if there is no proper attitudes toward ethnic diversity, it can create discrimination, sharp ethnic divides, intolerance, and racial prejudices such as inequality and unfairness in education, economy, politics and social affairs, etc.

Such negative consequences of ethnic diversity without proper attitude towards it can weaken the competitiveness of political participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, constraints on the chief executive and openness of executive recruitments that are indicators of the level of democracy. For example, ethnic diversity without proper or positive attitude toward ethnic diversity can create racial discrimination, intolerance, and social, economic, and political prejudices among different ethnic groups. These consequences can weaken openness of the executive recruitment by lacking transparency to the different discriminated in the recruitment process, competitiveness of political participation by restrictions of voting rights of the different, competitiveness of executive recruitment by unfair restrictions on the different in competition for the executive, and the constraint on the chief executive by lacking the power of the different to have influence on the chief executive. Such negative impacts of ethnic diversity without positive or proper attitude towards it can damage the effects of other positive attitude such as positive attitude toward income equality on the level of democracy. Thus, it is essential to have proper or positive toward ethnic diversity to reduce such negative impacts on the relationship between the positive attitude toward income equality and the level of democracy, and diminish the negative or destructive impacts on the level of democracy by itself.

Positive attitudes toward ethnic diversity create positive and proper conditions for democracy. For example, the benefits or positive consequences of ethnic diversity with positive

attitude towards it can reduce the sharp ethnic divides creating tolerance, harmony and common sense among different ethnics, which are followed by more fairness and less prejudices in politics, economy and social affairs. Such positive consequences can enhance the competitiveness of executive recruitment, of the competitiveness of political participation, of the openness of executive recruitment, and constraint on the chief executive, thus promoting democracy (See Figure 2). Moreover, these positive consequences can enhance the relationship between the positive attitude toward income equality and the level of democracy (See Figure 1: Positive Attitude Model 1). Figure 1 explains that positive attitudes towards ethnic diversity and democratic political systems affect democracy indirectly. These attitudes enhance the relationship between positive attitudes toward income equality and the level of democracy. However, Figure 2 explains that attitudes toward ethnic diversity and democratic political systems not only influence the democracy directly but also influence the relationship between positive attitudes towards ethnic diversity and the level of democracy, vice versa.

Then, the question to ask is not whether ethnic diversity is a problem of democracy in the countries or not, but whether what kind of attitudes of the people towards ethnic diversity can promote democracy? I suppose that the positive and constructive feelings or attitudes toward ethnic diversity other than negative and destructive attitudes to it promote democracy. I assume that increase in positive attitude towards democracy causes increase in level of democracy. Thus, the more positive the attitude towards the ethnic diversity is the higher the level of the democracy will be. I expect that there is a positive relationship between the positive attitude towards ethnic diversity and the level of democracy. Thus, I hypothesize

Hypothesis 2: Positive attitudes towards ethnic diversity promote democracy. That is, more positive attitudes toward ethnic diversity lead to the higher levels of democracy.

Positive Attitudes Toward the Democratic Political System

I assume that a democratic political system is a primary requirement for further improvement of democracy. Lack of it can create the destructive conditions to develop democracy further. For example, the democratic political system requires democratic procedures, institutions, and means of decision-making other than other authoritarian system. Lack of such constructive and positive conditions can disturb the betterment of democracy. Such disturbances can weaken the competitiveness of political participation by framing biased and discriminative procedures in favor of one side against another. They also abate the competitiveness of executive recruitment by means of discrimination or exclusion against the oppositions. Moreover, These disturbances restricts openness of executive recruitment because of lack of free and fair procedures or process for recruitment, and weaken constraint on the chief executive because of lack of sound institutions, procedures and decision-making process to check and balance the chief executive. For examples, multiparty and multicandidate competitions are not the requirements in the communist and the authoritarian systems. They mostly have uncompetitive one party systems and one party-dominated system. Their systems do not require democratic procedures, institutions and means of decision-making that preserve or promote democracy, thus discriminating and punishing the oppositions against them. However, the democratic political systems, at least, requires minimal democratic procedures, institutions, and means of decision-making. These procedural and institutional requirements are the basis for further advancement of democracy.

Accordingly, I assume that democratic political system itself matters as to the level of democracy. The democratic policy system is the basic minimum requirement to upgrade democracy. It can create good conditions to promote the competitiveness of political participation, the competitiveness of executive recruitment, the openness of executive recruitment, and the constraint on the chief executive. For such conditions to follow, the democratic political system is assumed to be requirement for democracy. However, such democratic political system without proper or positive attitudes toward it is doubtful to have its positive consequences that can promote the level of democracy. At this point, it needs clarification of difference between the attitudes towards the democratic political system and the democratic political system. Attitude toward the democratic political system is the subjective concept. It means the personal and subjective feelings and opinions of the respondents about the democratic political system. However, the democratic political system itself is not subjective but rather it is an objective concept composed of actual and intrinsic components such as democratic institutions, rules and procedures. Thus, attitudes towards the democratic political system differ definitively from the democratic political system. This thesis focuses on the attitude toward the democratic political system other than the democratic political system.

I suppose that the democratic political system without proper or positive attitudes to it can negate the positive effects of the democratic political system on the level of democracy. For example, negative attitudes toward the democratic political system can undermine the democratic rules, procedures, institutions, and norms, thus causing undemocratic treatments within democratic society and damaging the existence of the democratic political system. These negative attitudes can also disturb the favorable conditions that can promote the competitiveness of executive recruitment, the competitiveness of political participation, the openness of executive

recruitment, and the constraint on chief executive. Hence, positive attitudes toward the democratic political system are important not to negate the positive consequences of democratic political system. They can also ensure the positive consequences of the democratic political system. For example, positive attitudes toward democratic political system that constitute the democratic procedures and democratic decisions-making can enhance the fairness of the competitiveness of the political participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment and the openness of executive recruitment that are the indicators of the democracy.

In addition, such positive consequences of the democratic political system enhanced by positive attitudes towards it can also enhance the relationship between positive attitudes toward income equality and the level of democracy. It is because the negative consequences of the negative attitudes toward the democratic political systems, thus undermining democracy, can negate the influences of positive attitudes toward income equality on the level of democracy. For example, the undermined democratic procedures and institutions damage and mitigate positive consequences such as equal political opportunity and political participation of positive attitudes toward income equality. Accordingly, positive attitudes toward the democratic political system affect the level of democracy and also enhance the effect of the positive attitudes to income equality on the level of democracy. I suppose that changes in attitudes towards democracy causes changes in the level of democracy. Specifically, the more positive the attitude towards the democratic political system is the higher the level of democracy will be. I expect there is a positive relationship between the positive attitude towards the democratic political system and the level of democracy. Moreover, I expect that there will be significant changes in effects of positive attitudes toward the democratic political system on the level of democracy if the other

two factors, positive attitudes toward income equality and ethnic diversity are accounted in the analysis. I hypothesize:

Hypothesis 3: Positive attitudes toward the democratic political systems promote democracy. That is, the more positive attitudes toward the democratic political system are, the higher the level of democracy is.

Thus, it follows:

Level of Democracy = positive attitudes towards income equality + positive attitudes towards ethnic diversity+ positive attitudes towards democratic political system, all other things being equal.

CHAPTER 2

Method

The unit of analysis in this thesis is the country. The dependent variable is the level of democracy. The data comes from the country-level data on democracy from Polity IV (Polity IV Annual Time-Series Data 1918-2010). However, for cross-sectional analysis purpose, I use only the 2010 data on the dependent variable, the level of democracy. The independent variables are attitudes towards income equality, ethnic diversity and democratic political system. The data for them is individual level data within the countries from World Values Survey 1981-2008 (2009; 2011). Thus, it is important to have country-level aggregated data of independent variables. I aggregated the recent individual-level surveyed data of independent variables from World Values Survey 1981-2008 using Stata software. These independent variable data used in this thesis are from World Value Survey 1981-2008 (2009; 2011) that did survey in 87 societies. The survey includes 256, 000 interviews. I use the latest or recent data from aggregated data of five-wave surveys. The measurements of these variables used in this paper are the same measurement scale with recoding some variables done in the survey of WVS 1981-2008. The data is the aggregated data for country level analysis. For the dependent variable, the data are available for 159 out of 164 countries. For the dependent variables, the data for the attitude toward income equality are available for 56 out of 164 countries; The data for attitude toward ethnic diversity are available for 45 out of 164 countries; The data for attitude toward democratic political system are available for 55 out of 164 countries.

Measurement

The dependent variable is the level of democracy. The level of democracy is measured

in Polity IV (see also validity of measurement of Polity III) on 11 points scale (See Coppedge and Reinicke 1990; Plumper and Neumayer 2010). “0” means “no criteria of democracy” and “10” means “Strong Democracy that meets the democracy criteria”. “The Polity Democracy Index ranges from zero to ten and is derived from coding the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive” (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared 2008). In the Polity IV (2010), democracy measurement consists such element as, “The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The operational indicator of democracy is derived from coding of the competitiveness of political participation (variable 2.6), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (variables 2.3 and 2.2), and constraints on the chief executive (variable 2.4)”. The following is how the coding is done in Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual.

Authority Coding	Scale Weight
<i>Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (XRCOMP):</i>	
(3) Election	+2
(2) Transitional	+1
<i>Openness of Executive Recruitment (XROPEN):</i>	
only if XRCOMP is Election (3) or Transitional (2)	
(3) Dual/election	+1
(4) Election	+1
<i>Constraint on Chief Executive (XCONST):</i>	
(7) Executive parity or subordination	+4
(6) Intermediate category	+3
(5) Substantial limitations	+2
(4) Intermediate category	+1
<i>Competitiveness of Political Participation (PARCOMP):</i>	
(5) Competitive	+3
(4) Transitional	+2
(3) Factional	+1

(Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2011, p.15)

In other words, democracy is measured by using competitiveness in political participation, the limitations on the executive, and open and competitive selection (See also Munck and Verkuilen, 2002). The dependent variable used in this country-level analysis is taken from Polity data, specifically the democ variable in Polity IV Annual Time-Series 1800-2010 dataset. The numbers of the countries that have data for 2010 are 164 countries. Five countries scored with - 77 and - 66 are left out because they are not relevant to democracy scale from “0” to “10”. They are Haiti, Bosnia, Ivory Coast, Somalia and Afghanistan. Thus, 159 countries have data for analysis.

There are three independent variables. First, it is the attitude towards income equality. I use the measurement of e035 or income equality (I rename e035 variable in the WVS 1981-2008-v20090914.dta as IncomeEqualityAttitude) done in the World Value Survey 1981-2008 (2009; 2011). The original scale of measurement is from 1 to 10. “1” means “income should be more equal” and 10 means “we need larger income differences as incentives”. I recode as a scale of from 1 (we need larger income differences as incentives) to 10 (income should be more equal). The question done in the survey is “Incomes should be made more equal vs. we need larger income differences as incentives”.

Second, it is the attitude towards ethnic diversity. I use the same measurement of g032 or ethnic diversity (I rename g032 variable as EthnicDiversityAttitude) done by the World Value Survey 1981-2008. It is measured on 10-point scales from 1 that means, “Ethnic diversity erodes a country's unity” to 10 that means, “Ethnic diversity enriches my life”. It is aggregate data from the survey done in different countries by World Values Survey from 1981 to 2008.

Third, it is the attitude towards democratic political system. WVS measures e117 or democratic political system (I rename e117 variable as DemPolSystemAttitude) on 4-point scale–

1 (very good), 2 (fairly good), 3 (fairly bad), and 4 (very bad). I recode it as a scale of “1” as “very bad”, “2” as “fairly bad”, “3” as “fairly good”, and “4” as “very good”. The question type WVS did through survey is, “I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Whether “Having a democratic political system” is on which one of 4-point scale.”

Regression

Level of Democracy = cons + positive attitude towards income equality + positive attitude towards ethnic diversity + positive attitude towards democratic political system

$$Y = 18.704 + .986X_1 - .085X_2 - 4.512X_3$$

Table 1: Attitudes towards Income Equality, Ethnic Diversity and Democratic Political System and Level of Democracy

Independent Variable	Level of Democracy	
	Coefficient	(Std. Error) ()
Attitude to Income Equality (IncomeEqualityAttitude)	.986*	(.487)
Attitude to Ethnic Diversity (EthnicDiversityAttitude)	-.085	(.433)
Attitude to Democratic Political System (DemPolSystemAttitude)	- 4.512	(2.384)
_cons	18.704	(9.373)
Adj R squared = 0.104		

* $p = .050$

Table 1. Number of observations is 42. The attitude to income equality has positive significant effects on the level of democracy. The coefficient is .99, which means that a unit increase in the positive attitude towards income equality causes .99 unit increase in the level of democracy. However, the other two variables, attitudes towards ethnic diversity and democratic political system do not show significant effects on the level of democracy. Asterisk is a statistical significant symbol that represent P value .05

Table 2: Effects of Attitude towards Income Equality on Level of Democracy without Attitudes towards Ethnic Diversity and Democratic Political System

Independent Variable	Level of Democracy		Level of Democracy	
	Coefficient	(Std. Error)	Coefficient	(Std. Error)
Attitude towards Income Equality	.986*	(.487)	.688	(.486)
Attitude towards Ethnic Diversity	-.085	(.433)		
Attitude towards Democratic Political System	-4.512	(2.384)		
-con	18.704	(9.373)	3.951	(2.500)
Adj R squared	.104			

* $p = .050$

Table 2. The 2nd column shows coefficients of all three variables that are included. The 3rd column shows coefficient of the attitude toward income equality when other two variables are excluded from analysis. The attitude toward income equality has positive significant effect on the level of democracy in 2nd column where the other two variables are included in analysis. However, its positive significant effect disappears in the 3rd column where the other two variables are omitted. The number of observations in the 2nd column is 42, but 53 in the 3rd column.

Table 3: Effects of Attitudes towards Ethnic Diversity and Democratic Political System on Level of Democracy without Attitude towards Income Equality

Independent Variable	Level of Democracy		Level of Democracy	
	Coefficient	(Std. Error)	Coefficient	(Std. Error)
Attitude towards Income Equality	.986*	(.487)		
Attitude towards Ethnic Diversity	-.085	(.433)	-.056	(.450)
Attitude towards Democratic Political System	-4.512	(2.384)	-4.548	(2.477)
-con	18.704	(9.373)	23.566*	(9.413)
Adj R squared	.104			

* $p = .050$ or $< .05$

Table 3. The 2nd column shows coefficients of all three variables. The 3rd column shows coefficients of two variables and omits the attitude toward income equality. The attitudes toward ethnic diversity and the democratic political system do not show any significant effects with omission or inclusion of the attitude toward income equality. The number of observations is 42 in both the 2nd column and the 3rd column. Asterisk is a statistical significant symbol that represent P value .05 or less than .05

Table 4: Effects of Attitude towards Ethnic Diversity on Level of Democracy without Attitudes towards Income Equality and Democratic Political System

Independent Variable	Level of Democracy		Level of Democracy	
	Coefficient	(Std. Error)	Coefficient	(Std. Error)
Attitude towards Income Equality	.986*	(.487)		
Attitude towards Ethnic Diversity	-.085	(.433)	.070	(.448)
Attitude towards Democratic Political System	-4.512	(2.384)		
-con	18.704	(9.373)	7.103*	(2.967)
Adj R squared	.104			

* $p = .050$ or $< .05$

Table 4. The 2nd column shows coefficients of all three variables. The 3rd column shows the coefficient of the attitude toward ethnic diversity and omits other two variables. However, the attitude toward ethnic diversity does not show any statistical significance with inclusion or omission of other two variables. The number of observations is 42 in the 2nd column and 43 in the 3rd column. Asterisk is a statistical significant symbol that represent P value .05 or less than .05.

Table 5: Effects of Attitude towards Democratic Political System on Level of Democracy without Attitudes towards Income Equality and Ethnic Diversity

Independent Variable	Level of Democracy		Level of Democracy	
	Coefficient	(Std. Error)	Coefficient	(Std. Error)
Attitude towards Income Equality	.986*	(.487)		
Attitude towards Ethnic Diversity	-.085	(.433)		
Attitude towards Democratic Political System	-4.512	(2.384)	-2.677	(2.220)
-con	18.704	(9.373)	16.643*	(7.595)
Adj R squared	.104			

* $p = .050$ or $< .05$

Table 5. The 2nd column shows coefficients of all three variables. The 3rd column shows the coefficient of the attitude toward the democratic political system. The result shows that the attitude toward the democratic political system has no statistical significance with omission or inclusion of other two variables. The number of observations is 42 in 2nd column but 52 in the 3rd column. Asterisk is a statistical significant symbol that represent P value .05 or less than .05

Results and Discussion

Table 1 shows the result of regression analysis of the level of democracy. The result reveals that the attitude towards the income equality (I rename e035 variable in the WVS 1981-2008-v20090914.dta as IncomeEqualityAttitude) significantly predicts the level of democracy. Its coefficient is 0.99 with P-value 0.05, which means that one unit increase in the attitude towards the income equality causes .99 units increase in level of democracy. If looking at 95 percent confidence interval, there is no zero between 95 percent confidence interval's lower and upper limit. Thus, it is safe to reject null hypothesis. Therefore, there is a significant and robust positive relationship between the attitude towards the income equality and the level of democracy. It proves the hypothesis that the more positive the attitude towards the income equality is the higher the level of democracy is. However, it is interesting to note that other independent variables such as attitudes towards ethnic diversity (I rename g032 variable from the datasets as EthnicDiversityAttitude) and the attitude towards democratic political system (I rename e117 variable in the WVS 1981-2008-v20090914.dta as DemPolSystemAttitude) have no statistical significance of their effects on the level of democracy. Thus, it is reasonable to doubt whether the significance of the attitude towards the income equality, the insignificance of the

attitude towards ethnic diversity, and the insignificance of the attitude towards democratic political system can change when changes happen to the analyzed independent variables.

The Table 2 shows the result that there is a change when some factors are not included into the regression analysis of the level of democracy. In the Table 2, I omit the two independent variables, the attitude towards the ethnic diversity and the attitude towards democratic political system in the regression analysis of the level of democracy. It is clear that the significance of the attitude towards income equality disappear when other two factors are omitted in the regression analysis. That is, the attitude toward income equality cannot predict the level of democracy without the other two factors, the attitude toward ethnic diversity and the attitude towards democratic political system, included in the regression analysis. In the Table 1, the attitude toward the income equality is significant when the other two factors are included in the analysis. However, that significance of the attitude towards income equality disappears when the other two factors are excluded from the analysis in the 3rd column of the Table 2. It shows that there is a relation between the attitude toward income equality and the other two factors, the attitude towards ethnic diversity and the attitude toward the democratic political system because exclusion of the other two factors from the analysis make the significance of the attitude towards income equality disappear and inclusion of other two factors make the attitude toward income equality significant. Thus, it needs to be more clear whether other the two factors without attitude towards income equality can have significant effects or not on the level of democracy. It is shown in the Table 3.

Table 3 shows that other two factors, the attitudes toward ethnic diversity and the democratic political system, still lack significance of their effects on the level of democracy when the factor, the attitude towards income equality, is excluded from the regression analysis of

level of democracy. It means that exclusion of the attitude towards income equality might not have strong affect or no effect on the relationship between the attitudes towards ethnic diversity and democratic political system and the level of democracy (see Third Column in Table 3). Thus, exclusion (3rd column in Table 3) or inclusion (2nd column in Table 3; Table 1) of the attitude towards income equality does not cause any significant change in the effects of other two factors on the level of democracy. However, the inclusion (Table 1; and every 2nd columns in Table 2, 3, 4, 5) and exclusion (3rd column in Table 2) of other two factors, the attitudes toward ethnic diversity and democratic political system, in the regression analysis causes significant changes in the effects of the attitude toward income equality on the level of democracy because the inclusion of the attitudes toward ethnic diversity and democratic political system in the regression analysis leads to the significance of the effects of the attitude towards income equality on the level of democracy.

Moreover, to be sure whether the attitude towards ethnic diversity alone has a significant effect on the level of democracy or not, I analyze it excluding other two independent variables the attitudes towards income equality and the democratic political system from the regression. The 3rd column of the Table 4 shows that there is no significant effect of the attitude toward ethnic diversity on the level of democracy. The 2nd column and the 3rd column of the Table 4 shows that the attitude toward ethnic diversity cannot predict significantly with or without inclusion or exclusion of other two factors, the attitude toward income equality and democratic political system. Then, the last of the three independent factors in the regression is the attitude towards democratic politically system. Does it alone have a significant effect on the level of democracy when other two factors, the attitudes toward income equality and ethnic diversity are excluded from regression analysis? Table 5 shows that it does not have.

Table 5 results in that there is no significant relationship between the attitude towards democratic political system and the level of democracy even when attitudes toward income equality and ethnic diversity are excluded from regression. The exclusion (3rd column of Table 5) and inclusion (2nd column of Table 5) of other two factors, the attitudes towards income equality and ethnic diversity, do not cause significant changes in the effect of the attitude towards the democratic political system on the level of democracy. Thus, attitude towards democratic political system cannot predict the level of democracy with or without other two factors, the attitudes toward income equality and ethnic diversity.

In sum, there are five tables in this paper as to regression analysis of level of democracy. Table 1 has two columns, the independent variable column and the level of democracy column. In the 1st column, there are three independent variables, attitudes towards income equality, ethnic diversity, and democratic political system. In the 2nd column, it shows their respective coefficient estimates. As already discussed, only the attitude towards income equality cause significant change in the level of democracy whereas other two, the attitudes toward ethnic diversity and democratic political system, have no significant effects on the level of democracy. From the Table 3 to 5, each table has three columns. The 1st column of each table, from Table 2 to 5, is the independent variable column. The 2nd column of each table 2 to 5 is the column of the dependent variable, the level of democracy with estimates of all three factors' effects on the level of democracy in regression analysis. However, the 3rd column of each table 2 to 5 is the column of estimates in the regression analysis with exclusion or inclusion of certain factors among the three factors.

As to statistical significance of the attitudes towards the income equality (See Table 1), it explains the level of democracy by 10 percent (Adj R-squared = 0.10). The positive attitude

towards income equality is significant only when other two factors, the attitudes toward ethnic diversity and democratic political system, are included in analysis. With inclusion of those two factors, the significance of the effects by the attitude towards income equality on the level of democracy does take place. As already discussed, the Positive Attitude Model 1 works whereas the Positive Attitudes Model 2 does not work. Thus, it can be inferred, according to the Positive Attitude Model 1, that positive attitude towards income equality affect the level of democracy positively and significantly with correlation of the other two independent variables, the attitude towards ethnic diversity and democratic political system. Without correlation of other two independent variables, the positive attitude towards income equality loses its significance. It means that there is correlation among the factors that enhance relationship between attitude toward income equality and the level of democracy to be significant. However, that correlation among the factors only affect the relationship between the attitude towards income equality and the level of democracy whereas no significant affect on other relationships between attitudes towards ethnic diversity and democratic political system and the level of democracy. Thus, the Positive Attitude Model 1 is more convincing than the Positive Attitude Model 2.

CHAPTER 3

Conclusion

As already discussed, this thesis emphasizes why the levels of democracy are different across countries. There are many different definitions of democracy in the literature. It is hardly to find any consensus agreement about it. However, there are, to certain extent, general views of democracy. I apply the definition and measurement of democracy used in the Polity IV Project: Dataset Users' Manual (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011) in this thesis. Moreover, the literature I analyze shows that there are many different factors that explain democracy, its aspects, its features, its dimensions, and its qualities. Certainly, this thesis uses new variables to explain the different level of democracy.

The model I presents in this thesis, the Positive Attitude Model, explains the level of democracy. This model supposes that income inequality is the problem. It can degrade the democracy. Such income inequality can have negative and destructive consequential problems. The negative consequences are accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few people, extension of rich-and-poor gap, and creation of unequal opportunities and rights in political, social and economic statuses. In addition, they degrade socio-economic status of the majority, the poor and the underprivileged. Hence, income inequality can lead to the political, social and economic grievances or problems, which will force the victims of income equality to resort to submission or revolution against such negative situations. The victims of the income inequality who choose to commit revolution or crimes for their individual remedy to their political, social and economic problems can destabilize the society. These negative circumstances deteriorate their competitiveness of political participation and executive recruitment, and their power to check the executive, thus degrading the level of democracy.

It is essential to recognize that these are these issues to handle such consequences of income inequality. There has to be willingness and attitudes to sort out such income inequality. The attitude towards income inequality is important because it precedes income inequality. Then, it is essential to know which kinds of attitudes, positive or negative, towards income inequality is important to handle the consequential problems of income inequality. I presume that negative attitude towards income inequality differ from positive attitude towards income inequality. Their respective and different consequences will follow. I suppose that negative attitude towards income inequality more relates to solution of the consequential problems of income inequality. The negative attitude towards income inequality is termed as “positive attitude towards income equality” I use in this thesis. That is, the negative attitude towards income inequality is the same as the positive attitude towards income equality.

The positive attitude towards income equality plays an important role in creating the positive circumstances. It reduces negative consequences of income inequality and also promotes income equality at the same time. Income equality can eliminate or lessen the negative consequences of income inequality. It can moderate unfair accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few people making more fair income distribution, narrows have-or-have-not gap, and generate more equal opportunities and rights in political, social and economic statuses. It also improves socio-economic status of the majority, the poor and the underprivileged. Accordingly, such positive scenario let the people less suffer from income inequality and its negative consequences such as the political, social and economic grievances or problems.

The people who are satisfied with income equality and its positive consequences in political, social and economic affairs can choose more peaceful and harmonic living along with the trend of society without resort to revolutions, violent or non-violent revolution, and crimes.

These satisfactory situations for their living can condition the stability of the democratic society. In such stable society, equal income improves the people's competitiveness in political participation, in executive recruitment, and their restrictive power on the executive, which affect the level of democracy. However, it is unreasonable to assume that income equality and its positive consequences happen without attempts to take or taking steps or actions to do so. Attempt to take or taking necessary actions for income equality and its benefits requires the positive attitudes in advance to reach income equality. Hence, the positive attitude towards income equality leads to attempts to take or taking actions for income equality that produces positive consequences, thus enhancing the competitiveness in political participation, competitiveness of executive recruitments, and constraining power on chief executive. In sum, positive attitude toward income equality enhances or promote level of democracy.

However, it is unlikely to have a significant effect of the positive attitude towards income equality on the level of democracy without correlation of other positive attitudes towards other issues such as ethnic diversity and the political democratic system. That is, the effect by "the positive attitudes towards income equality" on level of democracy is hard to be significant in absence of the influences of the positive attitudes towards ethnic diversity and political democratic systems because the lack of positive attitudes towards ethnic diversity and the political democratic system can cancel out the effects of the positive attitude towards income equality on the level of democracy. I reason that the negative attitudes towards ethnic diversity and the political democratic system may hold back promotion of the level of democracy. They cancel out the effects of positive attitude towards income equality on the level and democracy and also generate their relevant negative consequences. However, the positive attitudes attitude

towards them can co-enhance the effects of the positive attitude towards income equality on the level of democracy.

The regression analysis of the level of democracy proves that the positive attitude model 1 works although the positive attitude model 2 does not. It means that the positive attitude toward income equality predicts the level of democracy significantly. That is, the positive attitude toward income equality increases the level of democracy increases. It is a positive relationship between the attitude towards income equality and the level of democracy. However, there is exception. Such significance of the effects of the income equality on the level of democracy only exists with correlation of other two factors, the attitudes towards ethnic diversity and the democratic political system. Exclusion of these two factors leads to the disappearance of the significant effect of the attitude toward income equality on level of democracy. It means that there is to some extent a correlation among the three factors to enhance the effect of attitude towards income equality on the level of democracy. However, the effects of other two factors, the attitudes towards ethnic diversity and democratic political system, on the level of democracy do not show any significance with exclusion or inclusion of other two factors in the analysis. That is why the results represent the Positive Attitude Model 1 eliminating the possibility of the Positive Attitude Model 2.

However, I want to make clear about the result of the significant effect of the attitude towards income equality on the level of democracy with influences of the other two factors, the attitudes towards ethnic diversity and the democratic political system. Such significance is not an absolute or unchangeable finding because there are many omitted factors from the regression analysis because of the limited resources such as time, money, and data availability. However, I assume that there are many factors that can influence the level of democracy. I include only three

factors in this analysis. This finding may change when the new researchers that focus on analysis of the level of democracy and include other new factors in the analysis to explain the level of democracy. There are two possibilities. The first is that the significance of the finding can disappear and the second is that it can increase in explanatory power of the finding in this thesis when new factors now left out are included in the future research.

I admit that there are many limitations to this study. First, I do not use control variables that I could have included in my analysis. Thus, there is a possible bias of omitted variables, which can confound the results. Such absence of control variables can be a problematic to this finding. A control variable is the alternative factor that can have confounding effects on the interest of the study from the main explanatory factor. It is used as to address the potential bias of omitted variables. Khing, Koehane and Verva (1994) point out the potential problem of limitation to the estimation of causal inferences when the relevant variables are omitted without using as control variables (See, however, Clarke 2009). “Scholars often include extra variables in their specifications to address the fear that omitted relevant variables will bias the results. The belief is that the inclusion of every additional relevant variable serves to reduce this potential threat. That is, a researcher cannot know all of the variables that appear in a certain data generating process, but if she knows and includes 15 of them, she is better off than if she knows and includes only 10 of them” (Clarke 2009, p.46). In other words, scholars have such a view of including all relevant variables as the control variable because omission of such relevant variables can confound the results. “The use of control variables comes directly from the omitted variable bias result. The reasoning is that we decrease the aggregate bias on the coefficient of interest for every additional relevant control variable that we include” (p. 49). That is to say, inclusion of the relevant control variables reduces collective bias on the coefficient of the

interests. However, Clarke (2009) challenges that basic assumption and reasoning by arguing that inclusion of all relevant variables as control variables does not necessarily reduce bias on coefficient of the interest. Such inclusion of relevant factors can decrease or increase the bias on the coefficient.

Although such contentious debate about potential bias of omitting relevant variables is still going on, most scholars have a general view that including all relevant factors as control variables make the results less biased. Hence, it convinces me that the results of the analysis of the level of democracy would be less biased if I had included all relevant factors such as income equality, ethnic diversity, democratic political system and political leadership that can confound the results of my study as control variables in addition to inclusion of positive attitude factors. For examples, with respect to political leadership, I assume that political leadership can extend, restrict and remove democracy. That is, the political leadership can promote or demote democracy. The choices made in process of the political leadership are critical to democracy. So it is important to make sure which kind of political leadership actually helps democracy before putting it into the regression analysis of the level of democracy. For example, democratic political leadership is strongly thought to be an alternative factor that promotes democracy. Then, it would be better to control it because my main explanatory factors are others. However, I cannot handle it in this paper because of the limited resources for me. I suggest that future researchers develop, conceptualize and measure democratic political leadership. And also I suppose that they apply it as a control variable for the level of democracy or as a main explanatory factor for democracy while controlling the main variables in the study of democracy.

Second, the limitation is that the analysis of the level of democracy is limited to cross-sectional analysis. It would be more convincing if the democratic time-series analysis could have

applied for the comprehensive study of democracy. It is because the cross-sectional analysis focuses only on the democratic score at a time of each country. Such democratic score collected at a time cannot completely represent democracy of each country. Democratic scores change over times. The democratic scores of each country are fluctuating. For example, India has democratic scores, 7 in 1976, 8 in 1994, and 9 in 2010. Thus, if only 9 that is the democratic score collected in 2010 is taken into account to represent democracy of India, it is riskier to evaluate democracy of India correctly than taking average of democratic scores India has had over time.

Third, there is another limitation to causal analysis between the attitudes toward income equality, ethnic diversity and democratic political system, and the level of democracy. Although conditional or interactive relationships among those factors for the level of democracy appear, I do not test interaction effects of these factors on the level of democracy. Rather, I simply look at the effect of each particular factor on the level of democracy. I should have included interactive or conditional variables to estimate coefficient of each factor on the level of democracy correctly and if done, the results would be more convincing. Moreover, there is a limitation to the sample size. The sample size is changing throughout analysis. Such unstable and changing samples may be problematic to the result of this study as well. It would be better if the same sample size could have been used throughout the analysis.

Finally, the weakness to this study is that I did not make robustness check. Although there are many datasets for democracy, I examine only the dataset of the Polity IV for the level of democracy. It can also be problematic to the results. For examples, it is important to make sure whether the result I get from using the dataset of Polity IV without looking at others' is different from or the same to the results when I use other democratic datasets. The results of this

study would be more persuading if I could have made sure that there was no influences of the differences between the Polity IV and other democratic dataset on the results of this study. In sum, these limitations are the main challenges to my study of the level of democracy. I could have solved these limitations only if I had had enough resources, such as data, time, and money.

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Political System on the Level of Democracy

Major Professor: Stephen Bloom